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1.- INTRODUCTION
Throughout the ages, water has been considered one of the most important 
natural resources that has made the development of civilization possible 
[Marshall, (1879); Gibbons (1986)]. Water resource availability has conditioned 
the location and growth of towns and contributed towards public health 
improvements. Its significance combined with its relative scarcity have made 
water the object of several conflicts. Its allocation among alternative uses, in order 
to attain high social welfare levels, has become one of more frequently discussed 
issues in the field of the economic theory of natural resources. 
In this research, our aim is to make a contribution towards improving 
water allocation by studying the productive process. In particular, we have 
focused on analysing potential cost savings corresponding to the final stage of 
water distribution, with a view to be applied to price regulation in this sector, and 
introduce incentives to get productivity improvements. In this sense, we base our 
approach on that followed by Thanassoulis (2000, a, b), using Data Envelopment 
Analysis methodology (DEA) and including some changes in the basic model in 
order to adapt it to the Spanish case. Scarcity problems which water suppliers in 
Spain have to face have motivated the inclusion of initial endowments of water 
resource as a non-controllable input for suppliers, as it is a factor that has 
conditioned the service in several Spanish regions. 
The study is structured as follows. First of all, a price regulation rule has 
been proposed, thereby justifying the usefulness of the DEA technique. Next, the 
Page 3 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3
methodology applied to obtain information about the relative productive 
performance of entities is described. In the two following sections, we describe 
the data and variables used and the productive units considered in the DEA 
analysis.  In the next section, we present the main results of this research. Finally, 
the paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
2.- A PROPOSAL FOR PUBLIC REGULATION OF WATER 
RESOURCES IN SPANISH MUNICIPALITIES
Regulation takes place when a public entity defines a behaviour 
framework for different economic agents (households, firms), establishing several 
obligatory constraints. Some services, such as water, electricity or gas supply, are 
habitual focuses of regulatory activity. In particular, quality and price restrictions 
are frequent in water distribution services. In this study we want to emphasize 
price regulation, because of the importance that pricing policies have in this 
context (OECD, 2001).
Spanish legislation defines urban water distribution as a public utility that 
has to be provided by municipalities. Prices of this service are subject to a two-
step approval process, in the context of an authorized tariff regime. First of all, 
prices are provisionally approved by the municipality, with the Autonomous 
Regions, through its Price Commissions1, providing the definitive approval of the 
prices proposed by local governments. In this process, price structure is not 
conditioned, and there are no explicit rules that limit the evolution of tariffs.  
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This latter fact generates important differences in Spanish price levels 
[MMA (1998); INE (1999)], which are never justified strictly by cost or other 
supply conditions. In this sense, it was shown that the expectations of a cheap 
resource availability and the subventions linked to water prices are the source of 
current problems, leading to insufficient incentives for promoting water savings 
(MMA, 1998). In our country, water bill amount to a very small proportion of the 
total households’ expenditure, so that fact reduces the effectiveness of prices as a 
mechanism to manage water demands in urban contexts (Martinez-Espiñeira and 
Nauges, 2004). To address this situation, the European Directive 2000/60/CE 
establishes the framework to guide water policies for EEC members, with a focus 
on cost recovery. Its basic objective consists of avoiding highly subsidized, 
below-cost pricing caused by political reasons. 
In a parallel way of water tariff design (OECD, 1987;1999), it would be 
interesting to study some rule that set global limits on price evolution. These kinds 
of restrictions, called  price-cap regulation, have been defended because of its 
superiority with respect to other regulatory methods, such as rate-of-return or 
cost-plus regulation [Schmalensee (1989); Liston (1993)]. The best-known 
example in this context is RPI - X regulation, where RPI is a retail price index and 
X is a factor connected with supplier productivity or efficiency. The flexibility of 
this rule has been highlighted in that price ceilings are defined for a bundle of the 
firm’s products and /or services. 
In this research, framed as it is in a public management environment, we 
have chosen a specification of this methodology which depends on the specific aid 
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that supplier is searching for2. The features of units evaluated in this study lead us 
to consider the hypothesis that those units are social welfare-maximizing, or, 
even, vote-maximizing. Under this assumption, price ceilings would have to be 
fixed in minimum terms, to avoid reducing prices too sharply (Bös, 1994). In this 
case, price variation, P, could not be lower than the following limit:
XRPIP  (1)
According to the preceding expression, more efficient entities face a lower 
limit, and would have to raise prices less than inefficient ones. Incentives to save 
costs are clear. Suppliers would try to increase efficiency, and consequently the X 
factor, thereby achieving a lower ceiling in the next period. 
The X-index can be exogenously given as far as the regulated entity is 
concerned, in which case we speak of a political regulation, or it can be fixed in 
an endogenous manner, which can be referred to as productivity-related 
regulation. Under both variants, the regulator provides incentives for improving 
supplier performance, and it would be necessary to evaluate the temporal 
evolution of each productive unit efficiency. This fact introduces a role for Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as an instrument with which productivity 
performance can be analysed, and which is described in the next section.  
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3.- USING DEA IN THE CONTEXT OF WATER DISTRIBUTION 
As it was noted in the introduction, the nature of this research implies, as 
an intermediate step, the evaluation of potential cost savings of entities that supply 
water in an urban context in order to define a valid regulatory approach. We have 
used DEA methodology, in accordance with several studies applied to water 
services [Aida et al. (1998); Thanassoulis (2000, a; b)]. 
This is a non-parametric methodology, in that unlike most econometric 
methods, no parameters specifying a particular functional form need to be 
calculated. First developed by Charnes et al. (1978), it is a general linear 
programming-based technique to evaluate productive efficiency. Assuming 
homogeneous productive units, a frontier formed by efficient units is designed. In 
the primal optimization programme, and considering a sector with K suppliers, 
which produce s outputs denoted by y, using m inputs denoted by x, the efficiency 
of productive unit k0 would require solving the following constrained programme:
=
0kh     Máx.     =
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1
       (2)
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With regard to the remaining notation, ur and vj denote, respectively, the 
weights to be assigned to outputs and inputs,   is a non-Archimedean 
infinitesimal, while 
0kh is the efficiency index of the k0 supplier. As can be seen, 
the preceding programme is orientated towards output maximization, under 
constant returns to scale (CRS). 
This basic model has been adapted by Thanassoulis (2000, a), who 
estimated potential cost savings in the specific context of the British water 
distribution sector. He used DEA methodology as an instrument, transforming the 
previous model (output maximization orientated) into an alternative version which 
made the interpretation of the model more transparent and whose final result is the 
calculation of the cost savings of the companies. Specifically, Thanassoulis 
obtained the following expression:
EFF x1k0 = UC*y1 y1k0 + UC*y2 y2k0 + UC*y3 y3k0 (3)
where x1 is the only input considered in his study,  y1 , y2 and y3  are three output 
categories produced by the supplier, EFF is the potential cost objective that must 
be reached by each supplier and UC*y1,2,3 are the optimal weights generated 
endogenously by adapting DEA programming and which are equivalent to the 
unitary cost of each output. In this sense, for those companies that verify EFF x1k0
< x1k0 , their potential cost savings would be (x1k0 - EFF x1k0) .
In our opinion, and considering that our final aim is the measurement of 
potential cost savings of the regulated entities, the adaptation of the basic DEA 
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model orientated to maximize output proposed by the author does not contribute 
to improving the transparency of the technique used. The reason is that under the 
constant returns to scale defended by the author the efficiency indexes assigned to 
each supplier (which are those which will ultimately generate a measure of 
potential savings) are the same, independently of the orientation of the DEA 
model.  Instead of the proposed version of adapting the basic model to maximize 
output, and since the final result is the same, a DEA model orientated to input 
minimization seems to be more appropriate as it has a direct interpretation in 
terms of potential cost savings. 
Following this reasoning, in the current study we use the original version 
of the DEA programme orientated to input minimization in order to detect cost 
savings for each municipality and year considered. These savings will be used to 
implement the proposal for price regulation to be finally applied in each 
municipality. 
However, it is necessary to specify some features that have to be taken into 
account in the Spanish case, so we have proposed some modifications on the basis 
of the preceding model. For example, in several Spanish regions suppliers have to 
face relative scarcity of water resources. We can say that there are high pressures 
on water in Spain, to the extent that it appears at the top of a ranking 
corresponding to a group of European countries (OECD, 1997). Economic water 
shortage is talked about, caused on the one hand by different endowments 
(heterogeneous climates), and on the other hand as a consequence of the impact of 
economic activity and socio-cultural features. Sometimes, this leads to the 
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application of rationing policies. Thus, during drought periods, suppliers could 
distribute lower output than in periods without restrictions in order to adjust 
available resources to existing demands. 
With a view to including in our analysis the effect of this technological 
characteristic, we have incorporated the rainfall of each geographical area and 
period, which would be defined as a non-controllable input by suppliers. In DEA 
literature, the importance of giving a differentiated analytical processing to these 
non-controllable inputs evaluated is accepted. Otherwise, the final results would 
be biased, thereby invalidating the information obtained in the analysis3. In light 
of this, two alternative models (M1 and M2) have been considered, where in the 
second one (M2) a non-controllable input has been included in accordance with 
the methodological guidelines existing in the literature for this kind of variable 
(Banker and Morey, 1986).
The definitive method used to calculate potential costs savings of a specific period 
and supplier has consisted of carrying out a separate DEA analysis in each 
municipality, oriented to input maximization. As productive units to be compared, 
we have used the results of the same municipality during the period analysed. 
Moreover, in order to check for its effects, an alternative version of the basic 
model which includes rainfall as a non-controllable input has been applied. 
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4.- VARIABLES 
 Having outlined the model which we use to study efficiency, we now turn 
to a description of the information used in the empirical application. In this 
section the definition and justification of variables included in the DEA analysis is 
presented. 
The choice of variables is a controversial issue in DEA analysis4. We have 
decided to follow the guidelines proposed by Thanassoulis (2000, a). Once he had 
settled on a group of variables, he finally connected a single input (operational 
costs) with a subset of outputs, such as water delivered, the level of properties and 
the length of mains. In our case, the variables which are included in the efficiency 
analysis are shown in Table 1:  
[INSERT TABLE 1]
In line with the situation described in the previous section, it is desirable to 
introduce an additional factor into the basic model in order to capture the effect of 
variables which cannot be controlled by the supplier and which can have an 
influence in the results. Thus, the density of rainfall taken up in the 
Hydrographical Basin where each municipality is located is incorporated in order 
to approximate the scarcity problems of water suppliers. 
As can be seen, three outputs have been included. The first one, number of 
m
3 delivered, is habitual in this context. The remaining output variables (KMNET, 
POPULATION) are related to the spread of service coverage from a geographical 
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point of view, and both have an important influence on costs (Thanassoulis, 2000, 
a).
5.- MUNICIPALITIES ANALYSED
With the aim of identifying the evolution of drought periods, and in order 
to evaluate efficiency trends over time, we use a time series from 1985 to 2000, 
both years inclusive, for three Spanish municipalities of different characteristics 
(Seville, Elche and Gijón), whose main features are described below. There are 
differences in terms of size, climate and socioeconomics aspects, which allow us 
to check the adaptation of the proposed model to several productive environments.
Seville constitutes the biggest municipality included in the study. Its 
population density is around 5,000 inhabitants per km2.  It is located in the south 
of Spain and is characterized by a continental climate with Atlantic influences, 
with high temperatures and poor rainfall. Currently, supply is delivered by a local 
public firm. The Municipal Water Company of Seville (EMASESA) is the 
organism that supplies the resource in the capital and in some adjacent towns. The 
progressive incorporation of those towns to the distribution service has made the 
supply system more complex. According to company sources, these towns had 
“five different network systems and singular pumping stations, together with a 
greater depth than that which was usually set in its basic distribution network 
(…)”(EMASESA, 1997, p. 39). The company manages several reservoirs directly, 
so it does not need to buy water input from external suppliers, except in 
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emergency periods. The leakages percentage registered in the network is high, 
reaching, in average terms for the period considered in this research, around 23%.
Elche is a municipality located in eastern Spain, whose population density 
is about 600 inhabitants per km2. It is made up of 22 towns, with different 
characteristics, including village settlements and tourist areas. However, 90% of 
the population is concentrated in the city of Elche. It is in an arid area with a 
concentration of rainfall in autumn. The water supply had been directly delivered 
by the municipal administration without the mediation of any company or 
organism. Water input is bought entirely from external suppliers. The Association 
of Taibilla Channels is the main source (supplying 80%-90%, depending on the 
period considered), followed by the Villena Channel (10%-20%). Average 
leakages during the period were about 18%.
The third and last municipality analysed in our study is Gijón, located in 
the north of Spain, with a population density close to 1,500 inhabitants per km2.  It 
is made up of 105 towns/villages, with a wide geographical dispersion. Again, 
95% of the inhabitants are located in the city of Gijón, and the remaining 
population is spread out over the other villages. The climate is characterized by 
mild temperatures, precipitations and seasonal differences. A public firm supplies 
water in the municipality (EMA).  The EMA was constituted in 1965 with the 
principal objective of resolving the deficiencies in the system at that time. 
Nowadays, these shortcomings have been eradicated, and the leakages percentage 
has been under 15% in recent years. Part of the supply needs are covered by water 
from reservoirs which are managed by the Consortium of Water Supply and 
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Sewerage in the central area of Asturias (CADASA). This association was created 
to deal with scarcity problems in the region, which had a high population density 
together with a notable level of industrialization. Currently, it supplies around the 
50% of the municipality consumption. 
Finally, in Table 2 we show statistics of the variables defined above for 
each municipality, and it is possible to see clear divergences among them.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
6.- RESULTS
The quantitative results from applying the models described in section 3 
(M1; M2) appear in the Appendix. This information is shown in Graphs 1 to 3, 
with comments immediately after in order to facilitate the visual interpretation of 
the evolution of performance corresponding to each municipality. 
With regard to global results, in the three cases analysed it was verified 
that the model M2 (which includes the effect of the non-controllable input) leads 
to higher or equal efficiency indexes than those obtained under the model M1 
(which does not include that effect). This is a result inherent in the methodology 
used and its significance in this case is not a very important issue since, as will be 
shown below, the important thing is to analyse the temporal evolution of 
efficiency indexes in each municipality and any divergence that may arise 
between the results of models M1 and M2.
Page 14 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
14
Studying the three graphs, it is possible to see differences across 
municipalities as to the evolution of efficiency in water distribution service over 
time. This is an especially interesting result because it is a direct consequence of 
the feature (mentioned when the Spanish sector was described) that there are large 
variations between the conditions and results of Spanish regions with regard to 
water supply, caused by differences in performance and in which economic and 
politic aspects intermingle. For this reason, it is more appropriate to comment on 
the results separately for each municipality, since, in the Spanish case, there are 
not common features with regard to supply conditions.  
[INSERT GRAPH 1]
Beginning with Seville, we can observe two different trends. At the 
beginning of the time series, performance is steady and, in relative terms, positive. 
This pattern is broken from the year 1996, when productive efficiency becomes 
notably worse. Low efficiency levels remain until the last year of our sample. 
However, the use of model M2 shows that, in the second lower-efficiency stage 
(1996-2000), the year 1998 is an exception, showing that bad results are 
attributable to the effect of climatic conditions and not to the poor management of 
the supplier, as can be deduced from the recuperation of the M2 index for that 
year. 
[INSERT GRAPH 2]
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With regard to the municipality of Elche, the most peculiar result is that 
climatic conditions have no effect on productive efficiency. As a consequence, the 
results of the models M1 and M2 are the same. This is probably explained 
because the fact that this municipality has got to adapt supply conditions to 
climatic fluctuations. Confirming this idea, the local authority alluded that it was 
not necessary to interrupt water supply, despite precarious climatic conditions, 
because of the existence of adequate infrastructures to face up to this kind of 
situations. Moreover, and in relation to evolution over time, an improvement of 
productive efficiency (with ups and downs) can be observed until the year 1995, 
after which the results become stabilized at lower levels than in that year but 
much higher than those in initial years. 
Finally, with respect to Gijón, we find again a different evolution from the 
previous municipalities. In this case, and after some initial years in which the 
results are very good, we can see a sharp reduction of productive efficiency which 
starts in 1988 and touches bottom in 1991. From this year, a progressive recovery 
is initiated, levelling off over the later years. In this municipality, as in the case of 
Seville, climatology has an huge effect. In particular, if we take into account its 
influence, the pronounced decreasing of efficiency in the intervening years is held 
up, so an adverse climatology would explain the bad results obtained in 1898 and 
1990. Likewise, the inclusion of climatic influence allows us to observe that the 
recovery of efficiency in the latest years continues until the year 2000, with 
similar levels to those obtained in initial years.
[INSERT GRAPH 3]
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After obtaining the results of efficiency in the three municipalities (which 
are linked to potential costs savings that could be achieved in each case), we 
would be able to connect those results with price regulation in the sector. In order 
to guide the evolution of future tariffs, the regulator could have an efficiency 
objective (X-factor), based on average efficiency over the period analysed (or 
another descriptive indicator) for each municipality, calculating as a expected 
deviation with respect to that average. The supplier would try to achieve 
efficiency improvements in order to reduce the ceiling on pricing. In this way, the 
public regulator gets to provide incentives for saving costs. 
7.- CONCLUSIONS
In developing countries, the attention paid to the regulation of provision 
(and production) conditions of the water supply service has increased in recent 
years. This study has been focused on the regulation of water prices in order to 
motivate suppliers to cut costs. For this purpose, a rule has been proposed to guide 
price evolution, based on price-cap regulation. The main objective of that 
instrument will be to provide public authorities an instrument that allows them to 
set prices according to economic rather than political criteria.
A prior step to setting water supply tariffs has been the analysis of the 
productive efficiency of suppliers in previous years, or to be more accurate, the 
measurement of the potential cost savings that they would have been able to 
achieve if their performance had been the best possible. The DEA methodology is 
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a useful instrument to implement this step. In this research, two variants of the 
method have been applied, depending on the inclusion (or not) of a non-
controllable input which shows differences in initial water resource endowments 
in the mathematical programme. 
The methodology proposed has been applied to three Spanish 
municipalities of different characteristics, analysing the evolution of their 
efficiency during the period 1985-2000. In Spain, there are divergences between 
water supply conditions across territories, a fact that is clear in light of the 
implausible evolution that the DEA results for each municipality show. Thus, the 
price-cap proposed must be objective, in order to avoid political interferences, 
and flexible, to allow its adaptation to the specific conditions of water supply in 
each municipality or area considered. 
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APPENDIX
Efficiency rankings: evolution over time
SEVILLE ELCHE GIJÓN
YEAR M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
1985 100.00 100.00 68.87 68.87 100.00 100.00
1986 93.07 96.11 69.72 69.72 100.00 100.00
1987 95.73 95.73 72.80 72.80 99.80 99.80
1988 96.00 100.00 79.96 79.96 97.80 100.00
1989 95.05 95.05 80.75 80.75 88.39 100.00
1990 93.80 100.00 70.42 70.42 82.27 100.00
1991 97.18 100.00 88.36 88.36 65.78 73.50
1992 94.82 97.68 81.18 81.18 78.27 79.83
1993 91.70 91.72 75.17 75.17 73.81 75.91
1994 99.97 100.00 85.30 85.30 76.43 80.86
1995 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 78.78 81.35
1996 87.18 87.18 82.00 82.00 82.55 85.82
1997 78.07 78.07 89.05 89.05 85.18 94.38
1998 80.66 100.00 88.54 88.54 85.20 100.00
1999 80.61 83.87 85.64 85.64 86.36 96.04
2000 85.50 85.50 84.94 84.94 84.32 92.02
AVERAGE 91.83 94.43 81.42 81.42 85.31 91.22
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TABLES AND GRAPHS
Table 1. Input-output variables in water distribution
Variable Definition
OUTPUTS
M3DEL Water delivered (m3)
KMNET Length of mains  (Km)
POPULATION Population supplied (number of inhabitants) 
INPUTS
Controllable: COSTOP Operational costs (2001 €) 
Non-controllable (M2): RAINFALL Density of rainfall (l per m2)
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables
SEVILLE ELCHE GIJÓN
mean stan.dev. mean stan.dev. mean stan.dev.
M3SUM 90,368,750.0 9,513,619.6 12,864,826.2 1,679,528.8 22,622,792.3 1,670,654.3
KMNET 2,891.6 779.8 519.9 35.1 864.4 109.6
POPULATION 1,120,888.0 115,793.0 186,855.0 6,756.0 264,014.0 4,110.0
COSTOP 47,889,353.5 8,919,579.0 6,150,437.0 473770.6 7,503,024.9 1,412,952.1
RAINFALL 575.5 197.9 455.8 118.9 1,321.9 141.5
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Graph 1.  Evolution of productive performance in the municipality of Seville
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Graph 2. Evolution of productive performance in the municipality of Elche
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Graph 3. Evolution of productive performance in the municipality of Gijón
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ENDNOTES
1
 Price Commissions are very heterogeneous organizations. Several agents take 
part in the price authorization process, such as members of the Regional administration, 
the water sector or consumer organizations.
2
 Price-cap regulation could be proposed as a minimum or maximum ceiling, 
depending on the objective set by the supplier. For more details, see Bös (1994).
3
 See, for example, Charnes et al. (1980), McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993), 
Ruggiero (1998) or Muñiz (2002).
4
 For specific details, see Lewin et al. (1982), Charnes et al. (1985) o Smith and 
Mayston (1987).
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